In this paper I want to shed light on two aspects of income mobility: relative total income mobility using the estimator by Fields and Ok [1999] and equalization of long-run incomes measured by the index of Fields [2004]. The cross country comparison shows a negative relationship between total relative mobility and long-run income equalization, this results is contrary to the intuition given by Shorrocks [1978a] who stated, that higher relative mobility will cause higher equalization of incomes when the accounting period is extended.
Introduction
There are reasonable grounds, [...] for supposing that the existence of mobility causes inequality to decline as the accounting interval grows. Furthermore the intuition suggests that the extent to which inequality declines will be directly related to the frequency and magnitude of relative income variations. [Shorrocks, 1978a] In this paper the second part of this statement will be challenged using cross country data from the European Community Household Panel. We will calculate the mobility measures axiomatized by Fields and Ok [1999] to get the magnitude of the relative income variation and the index by Fields [2004] to measure the ability to equalize incomes over time.
Closely related to this article is the study by Ayala and Sastre [2002] who considered a broad range of dierent mobility measures and compare several European countries and the United States. They used data from the ECHP from the years 1994 to 1998.
There aim is to connect the dierent notions of mobility to inequality, however, what has been left out was the essential index by Fields [2004] that gives a direct connection of inequality and mobility.
Data Description
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) provides us with household income data from dierent sources. The source of income that underlies our analysis is total net household income (ECHP code HI100) post-tax and post-transfers. So this income can be interpreted as the disposable income for the household. Furthermore all households that had zero income in any of the waves under investigation have been removed. Some further trimming was recommended, because, as Cowell and Schluter [1998] point out, mobility measures are very sensitive to data contamination, that has happened in several aspects (like the adjustment from gross and net wages by statistical authorities, either gross or net reportings of capital income depending on the interviewee as pointed out by Ayala and Sastre [2002, p. 5] ). In this case I trimmed the data as described in Ayala and Sastre [2002] 2 and didn't nd dierent rankings of the countries, so I kept using the untrimmed data in order to get as many observations as possible.
2 I dropped the 1% centile and the 99% centile of each country 1
To adjust for demographic events like birth of a child or death of a household member and dierent household sizes I am using the OECD scale for equalizing size(HD004), with which I divided HH income (1 + 0.7(adults − 1) + 0.5(HH size − adults)).
To make incomes comparable we used PPP rates provided in the ECHP (PPPyy).
Incomes are expressed in 1995 prices using the consumer price indices for each country provided by the World Bank. What is considered is therefore the real mobility, so we
are interested in what a household actually can aord.
The observation points are from 1995, 1998 and 2001 and includes all EU-15 countries except of Finland and Sweden. I used aggregate household data because 98% of all households reported positive income. However in more than a third of all entries from wave one to weave three at least some imputation has been made [see Peracchi, 2002] .
Controlling for imputation, i.e. using only data that has not been imputed, gives slight changes in the values of the indices, but hardly changes the ranking of the countries. A disadvantage of household data is that one is unable to assess income distribution over its members. For completeness, it is worth noting, that a balanced panel has been used according to be able to construct the mobility measures.
Choosing the household as the unit of analysis would give rise to numerous problems as Ayala and Sastre [2002] point out. One of it is that changes in the income assigned to an individual may be due to variations in the income of the household to which he or she belongs or to changes in its composition. Furthermore, if mobility measures that have welfare interpretations are used, all individuals in the household are attributed the same level of welfare. To resolve the rst issue, the OECD equivalence scale helps to keep track of the changing composition of the household, the second problem can not be resolved easily, because it would require consumption data of each individual member of the family.
Methodology
In the following the concepts used in the empirical part are introduced and discussed.
I will begin with the inequality measures and continue with the mobility indices.
Inequality Measures
Theil's measure comes from entropy theory in information economics [Theil, 1967, see] that evaluates the informational value of a situation. It can be reinterpreted im-mediately into a measure of inequality by viewing the probability of an event as the individual's proportion of total income. Let y i be the share of total income the ith person obtains. Let h(y) be a decreasing function of y (h(y) = log 1 y is commonly used).
be the measure of entropy or the information content. It reaches is maximum when y i = 1/n for all i. This leads us to following measure of inequality:
With the interpretation that the higher T the more unequal the income distribution.
Gini Coecient The Gini coecient can be dened as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of absolute equality and the area underneath the diagonal.
It is dened as:
The Gini coecient is bounded between 0 and 1. Highest inequality is denoted by 1 (in Lorenz interpretation 1 household possess 100% of economies income the rest nothing) lowest inequality is 0 (Lorenz curve equals line of absolute equality)
Mean Log Deviation takes more care at income transfers at the lower end, because it staggers the income distribution. Furthermore taking the dierences of logs eliminates the dependence on the scale because what goes in multiplicative at units falls out when taking logs and subtracting it from the mean. Let y i now be the income of household i in levels and n the number of households in the economy. The measure is then dened as:
One problem is, that this measure is not independent of the mean of the population's income. Income mobility is a concept that has to be analyzed across various dimensions, because it is so multi-facetted and the literature does not give a unique of what mobility is.
In his seminal paper on income mobility, Shorrocks [1978b] stated a few desiderata for mobility measures and showed that no index exists that can satisfy all of them.
However, some of this desiderata apply specically to inter-generational mobility where time-independence plays a signicant role to evaluate the mobility process (see the discussion in Fields and Ok [1996] ). A possible solution to this problem of multidimensionality of mobility is, to use several dierent measures, that are -in the best case -orthogonal to each other and therefore to get a more complete picture of income movements over time.
To classify mobility measures two branches can be thought as meaningful. (1) I am not convinced, that the data with which I am applying these measures on allow any statements about welfare, because I do not take into account the conditions a household is living and wether the a change in household's income was due to transfers received because of serious diseases. Furthermore the distribution of income within the household is completely neglected, and for welfare is a purely individualistic concept, an evaluation on the household level does not seem appropriate.
So I will focus mainly on following two measures: (1) the total per household logincome movement in an economy, that can be disentangled in a transfer and a growth component and (2) measure to evaluate a countries ability to equalize lifetime income.
These measures convey the information needed to challenge the statement by Shorrocks [1978a] .
The basic framework we are in is described by a population of households N = 1, ..., n. The income of household i at time t ∈ 0, 1 is denoted as y t i . The income distribution at time t is written as y t = y t 1 , ..., y t n . An income distribution is dened by a cdf F : R + → [0, 1] with nite mean µ F . Take X ⊂ R + as the set of feasible incomes. Let F(X) the class of all income distributions whose support is contained in a given subset X ⊆ R + . A mobility process is dened as a function M :
The basic question is how to evaluate the transition from y 0 to y 1 . Fields and Ok [1999] The mobility index axiomatized by Fields and Ok [1999] is a measure of the total absolute log-income movement in a society. It is given by:
Following properties fully characterize this measure:
• Scale Invariance: for all x, y ∈ R n ++ and λ > 0, m n (λx, λy) = m n (x, y)
This is the absolute mobility index that does not take into account the direction of the mobility, because of the symmetry axiom. The directional measure as suggested by its name takes into account the direction of mobility where higher income growth leads to higher mobility. In this case symmetry has to be give up and is replaced by following two properties:
For α > 1 and x, y ∈ R n ++ . The rst property means that if x → y is a "good" movement y → x has to be a "bad" movement in the sense of more or less mobile. The second property just states that a proportional increase for all incomes has to be a good movement. The directional measure ts in a utilitarian framework. Take the unit elasticity utility function as a function of real income U (a) = log a. m F O99 n has the interpretation of the aggregate change in social welfare.
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The measure for relative income movements decomposability into two components (1) total social utility growth and (2) total social utility transfer. It can be written as follows:
(log y 1i − log y 0i )
per capita social mobility growth + 2 n i∈L (log y 0i − log y 1i )
per capita social mobility transfer
Where L ≡ {i : y 0i > y 1i } is the set of individuals whose income has decreased over time. The rst component measures the total income growth of these two components the second part adds the components that has been lost by the losers (due of the assumption of positive growth, one has to add twice the amount lost by the losers, because everything lost by the losers has been gained by some winners). It is worth noting, that the growth component is exactly the directional measure dened in (3.2).
However, as all measures of mobility, it cannot describe all aspects of mobility. It fullls the some basic axioms that have been given as desiderata for mobility measures in the literature: (1) monotonicity (2) axiom of diagonalizing switches (3) monotonicity in distance. The relation of these axioms with the proposed measure are discussed in Fields and Ok [1996] . It is complementary to the traditional quintile transition matrix measures, because it is "insensitive to rerankings beyond what would be implied by the income changes themselves." [Fields and Ok, 1996] .
Mobility as long term equalizing phenomenon Fields [2004] To measure an income mobility process several measures or ranking devices have been considered in the recent literature . For example Benabou and Ok [2001] consider a technique taken from the taxation literature to rank countries according to their ability to equalize opportunities, i.e. to make future incomes origin independent. Fields [2004] criticizes the approach taken from the taxation literature and illustrates it with the following example. Take two income transitions I : (1, 3) → (1, 5) and II : (1, 3) → (5, 1). In both cases income inequality is more unequal in the second period compared to the rst period.
Fields [2004] argues that the question to answer is wether a mobility process is lifetime income equalizing. To measure wether a it can achieve this goal, approaches taken from the tax literature are not valid. This is because the feature of the taxation approach looks at the change from an already realized disposable income distribution at 6 time 0 to a realized income distribution at time 1. The dierence is striking, because in the tax literature one compares a realized but not paid out distribution with the distribution of disposable incomes. Therefore the interpretation of opportunity equalization is doubtful.
To resolve this problems he suggests following index:
Where I(·) is a static inequality measure (in this application the Gini coecient will be used, although Theil's measure or mean log deviation could also be used) andȳ is the vector of average income over the two periods 3 . The axioms underlying m F 04 are:
Let I(·) be an inequality measure and y l = (ȳ 1 , ...,ȳ n ), y s = (y 0,1 , ..., y 0,n ) be vectors of long-term and short-term incomes, respectively. Then m F 04 has following properties:
Normalization I(l) = I(s) ⇒ E(·) = 0, so if the inequality is the same for long-term and short-term income then no mobility takes place. Equalization I(l) < I(s) ⇒ E(·) > 0, when inequality is reduced over longer horizon then the index gets positive. On the contrary if inequality is larger in the long run, then the index gets negative, so
To compare two dierent income regimes one speaks about Greater Equalization if 1. For two alternative l vectors l 1 , l 2 ∈ L and given a vector s ∈ S, I(l 1 ) < I(l 2 ) < I(s) ⇒ E s,l 1 > E s,l 2 2. For two alternative s vectors s 1 , s 2 ∈ S and given a vector l ∈ L, I(
and of Greater Disequalization if 1. For two alternative l vectors l 1 , l 2 ∈ L and given a vector s ∈ S, I(
2. For two alternative s vectors s 1 , s 2 ∈ S and given a vector l ∈ L, I(l) > I(s 1 ) >
From these axioms it follows for E(I(l), I(s)) that it is decreasing in I(l), increasing in I(s) and equal zero when I(l) = I(s).
Fields states that this proposed measure is closely related to the measure by Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark [1985] . Although the latter index was not constructed to test equalization of life time incomes but give ethical advice, whether mobility has to be regarded as positive. Fields states that its design ts better to the question he poses than to the one it has been used for, because from an ethical perspective it gives too much weight to the equalizing part of mobility (which is on the other hand good for the assessment wether the mobility process is income equalizing).
3.3
Some illustrative examples Table 3 .3 provides you with the numerical values of the mobility indices, described in the following. However, there is a substantial part of mobility in the Fields and Ok measure of which 100 percent can be attributed to growth.
Bill Gates gets richer vs Bill Gates gets poorer
Complete vs incomplete income reversal Take again a population of 50 people and let the change of the income distribution be as follows: (1, 2,,49, 50) → ((50, 49,,2, 1)). This is the case of complete income reversal. The Fields measure attributes full mobility to this process, because it completely equalizes long run in- come. For the other measure we get also some mobility of which all can be attributed to the transfer component, because overall income stays the same. Now take a similar process except of the fact that the richest person gets even richer (the change has to be larger than 49). Fields measure would attribute to this process lower mobility than to the complete income reversal, because long-run incomes are are not perfectly equalized.
However, the Fields and Ok measure attributes more mobility to the incomplete income reversal, because additionally to the income reversal, there is overall income growth in the economy.
Symmetry of m F O n
Due to the symmetry axiom of the Fields and Ok [1999] the measure of income movement takes Paretian welfare evaluations out of mobility measurement. E.g. take the the two processes (1, 2) → (2, 3) and (2, 3) → (1, 2) the former process is certainly more desirable than the second but in the sense of the measure they are equally mobile, because each household experienced the same monetary income change. To get back a little bit of welfare interpretation to this approach, one can use the directional measure that reduces the amount of mobility when incomes fall from one period to the next. According to this measure the latter process is more mobile than the former.
Rerankings Consider now following income distributions [e.g. Fields and Ok, 1996 ]: Comparing the long term inequality measure in table 4.1 with the measures of any single year, one can see that long term income inequality is smaller than any observation for a single year, the question now is to which extent this has happened. An answer to this question will be given by the mobility index of Fields [2004] in the next section.
The most equal countries in the long run are: The Netherlands, Denmark and Germany, where on the other side of the scale Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece can be found. Fields and Ok [1999] Portugal exhibited the largest relative mobility over the entire period of which almost 80% can be attributed to the growth component. This is not surprising because of Portugal's rapid growth in the 1990s. Quite dierent is the situation in Austria, while overall relative mobility puts it in the middle of the ranking, the transfer component contributes over 43% of total mobility and therefore is both absolutely and relative to total mobility among the highest in Europe whereas the growth component is among the lowest. Countries that also show considerable contribution of growth to mobility are the UK, Portugal, Spain and Greece, while countries like Ireland, Denmark, Belgium and Austria exhibit the lowest growth components.
According to the Fields [2004] index all European countries are long term income equalizing, because their indices are positive. There is, however some variation in the equalization across countries. At the lower end of the scale one nds Luxembourg, Portugal, France, Ireland, Belgium and Denmark, while on the upper end are Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. Of these countries, it seems rather surprising that Italy is the most equalizing country among the EU-13. As expected and already stated by Shorrocks [1978a] the equalization of long term incomes gets stronger when the accounting period is extended. Very strong eects of the extension compared to the average of the subperiod indices could be found in Ireland and Spain with over 70% increase whereas in Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark this eect was rather small with only 16 − 26% increase. If we see a combination of a high growth component 4 and a high Fields index 5 as "good" mobility then we could gure out countries that are unambiguously better than others.
However this interpretation can not be given, because countries with low ability of equalization like Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, France and Portugal have a very wide variation in the growth component, while countries with higher relative mobility tend to uctuate around a growth component of 0.27. An interesting case is Portugal, that experienced a high proportion of income mobility due to growth but was not able to equalize incomes over the observation period, a result that suggests that mainly upper income classes could benet from extraordinary growth.
The relationship of the transfer component and the Fields index can be observed in gure 4.2. The correlation between those two indices across countries is 0.4048 which indicates a clear positive relationship between those variables and it still remains positive at 0.2, when Luxembourg is excluded from the sample. This suggests, that transfer as dened by that index is redistribution from richer households to poorer, where a higher level of transfer meant also a higher equalization of incomes in the EU-13.
Conclusion
In this article I looked at two dierent measures of mobility to compare 13 dierent European countries. The measures were total relative mobility, divided into a growth and transfer component, and the equalization of long-term incomes. What I found was a negative relationship between these two indices, when excluding Luxembourg from the sample, which is contrary to the intuition given by Shorrocks [1978a] . There is no clear relationship between the growth component and the equalization process, while transfer and equalization are strongly correlated.
Further research has to be done in looking for determinants of wage mobility. Theoretical underpinnings can mostly be found in the search literature (see Jovanovic [1979] or Burdett [1978] ) and the newer literature on job information networks [see Ioannides and Loury, 2004] .
